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In 2012, Brisa, a Portuguese road concession company, reviewed their presence 
in Brazil under a strategic alliance with local partners which had lasted for more than 9 
years.  
The case is based on information gathered in interviews to agents from Brisa 
present in Brazil and from events that occurred during the course of this alliance. The 
information includes comments and considerations about the relationship and 
expectations from the alliance between Brisa and the CCR Group. 
The internationalization process of Brisa starts in Brazil with a joint-venture 
with local partners, integrating the CCR Group.  The case describes the origin of this 
alliance, how it was established and the transfer of competencies between both parties 
as well as the results of the alliance. The description of the alliance is based on a series 
of episodes and facts that enhance the know-how acquired by each party. This know-
how helped Brisa and the CCR Group to achieve a position of success in the industry.  
This case can be used as a tool to understand the procedures used to develop a 
strategic alliance at the international level and the criteria to choose a partner. The 
students have the possibility to analyse various situations that are faced in a new 
international environment. Supported by other qualitative and quantitative data, this will 





This dissertation would not have been possible without the support of my 
professor Nuno Cardeal. For the past five months, his guidance and recommendations 
helped me develop a better understanding of the topic and better structure my personal 
project.  
I am grateful to Eduardo Costa Ramos, Business Developer of Brisa for all the 
support and availability in setting up the interviews and for imparting the valuable 
information that I needed to complete this case.  
I would also like to show my gratitude to João Azevedo Coutinho, António 
Nunes de Sousa, Valdemar Mendes, Manuel Lamego, Cláudia Garcia and Manuel 
Barreto for their time and availability for the interviews, and for being so understanding 
and giving me time off from the office to write my dissertation. I am also grateful to 
Vasco Trigoso da Cunha, who introduced me to Brisa. 
Thanks are due to all my dissertation seminar colleagues, Elisabeth Grácio, Inês 
Ferreira, Francisco Garcia, Frederico Marques, Guilherme Manuel Sousa and Miguel 
Teixeira-Pinto for the valuable feedback offered over the last few months.  
To my friends and family, I owe my deepest gratitude for the emotional support 
offered throughout this process.  
Finally, I would also like to show my sincere gratitude to the representatives of 
Católica Lisbon School of Business and Economics for all the support and guidance 
provided and experience and knowledge shared, which greatly contributed to help 
achieve the best performance possible during the international master’s degree program 






Table of Contents  
Abstract                                                                                          i 
Acknowledgements               ii 
Table of Contents              iii 
List of Exhibit               iv 
Chapters 
1. Case Study ............................................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 The Toll Road Concession Industry .................................................................................... 2 
1.3 Brisa .................................................................................................................................... 3 
1.4 The start of the alliance ....................................................................................................... 5 
1.5 The CCR Group .................................................................................................................. 6 
1.6 The Alliance Agreement ..................................................................................................... 8 
1.7 2001 to 2009 ........................................................................................................................ 9 
1.8 The final year of the alliance, 2010 ................................................................................... 12 
1.9 Legacy left in Brazil .......................................................................................................... 14 
1.10 Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 14 
2. Teaching Note ..................................................................................................................... 21 
2.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 21 
2.2 Synopsis ............................................................................................................................ 21 
2.3 Suggested Assignment Questions ..................................................................................... 22 
2.4 Teaching Objectives .......................................................................................................... 22 
2.5 Use of the Case .................................................................................................................. 23 
2.6 Relevant Theory ................................................................................................................ 23 




List of Exhibits 
 
Exhibit 1: Portuguese State Investments and their result on GDP 
Exhibit 2: Portuguese Network Km in Operation 1986-2001 
Exhibit 3: Brisa’s Value Chain 
Exhibit 4: Brisa Key Figures 2000-2009 
Exhibit 5: Brisa Cash-Flows in CCR  
Exhibit 6: BPE structure and timeline 
Exhibit 7: Brisa representation in the CCR group 
Exhibit 8: CCR Group Shareholders in 2006 
Exhibit 9: Brisa 2008 New Projects  
Exhibit 10: CCR Share price history 2002 - 2012 
Exhibit 11: Brisa Share price history 1998 - 2012 
Exhibit 12: GDP Evolution in Portugal and Brazil (2000- 20011) 






1. Case Study 
1.1 Introduction 
In 2012, two years after Brisa left their participation in Brazil in the CCR Group,
1
 
the CFO of Brisa João Azevedo Coutinho
2
 reported that what best characterized their 
nine years of joint venture was the perfect relationship between partners and their 
similarity of needs. 
“Brisa found the right partners in the right market. We created an excellent 
relationship with our partners that resulted in a great transfer of know-how and in a 
profitable business, not only in terms of capital but also in terms of experiences and 
best practices” 
In the nine-year joint venture relationship with the CCR, there were remarkable 




 “I think that both companies gained equally with this alliance. I’m definitely sure 
that for the partners of CCR it’s always a pleasure to talk to Brisa when it comes to 
business.” 
The strategic alliance went through several phases: the start-up; the know-how 
acquisition by each party; and the management of the alliance’s termination by both 
companies.   
Given the negative evolution of the Portuguese Economy that directly affected the 
use of the highways by the Portuguese people, who had less money to spend on the 
tolled highways, Brisa found a way to fight back these adversities with the 
internationalization. Its presence in several countries such as Brazil, Holland, the USA 
or, in the more recent years of 2011 and 2012, Turkey and India became a central point 
in the overall economic sustainability of the company.  
Brisa’s CFO referred that the alliance was an unlikely case of success in all parts of 
the alliance. The managers of Brisa understood that the internationalization was a key 
success factor to Brisa and they wanted to understand after this alliance what are the 
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 Companhia de Concessões Rodoviárias Group (herein referred to as “the CCR Group”). 
2
 João Azevedo Coutinho, member of the board of directors and of the executive committee of Brisa, 
interviewed on 9 November 2012  
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drivers and the characteristics that transformed this internationalization process in such 
a success.  
Brisa wanted to understand what contributed to the added value of this alliance 
and what Brisa’s benefit was in this cross border enterprise. What were the factors that 
led to the international success? 
1.2 The Toll Road Concession Industry 
Most countries have no toll roads. Where there are toll roads the tolled network 
typically comprises of less than 5% of the road network. In the tolls for passenger cars 
there are variations between and within countries, but these variations are not dependent 
on national income levels. Tolls for bridges and tunnels are considerably higher per 
kilometre reflecting both the higher cost of construction and maintenance, and the lack 
of alternative routes. Normally, the investments in this industry are intensive and with 
large loan commitments. 
In most countries with toll roads the private sector has been heavily involved in 
the development of the roads and often thereafter in their operation. In Latin America in 
particular, there has also been extensive involvement of the private sector in the 
maintenance and on-going operation of roads that were built by the public sector. The 
USA, Japan, and France are the key exceptions to this rule, where most toll roads are 
owned and operated by public corporations.  
Even where toll roads are operated by the private sector, Government support 
has been considerable in almost all cases.
4
 
The Portuguese Road Concession Industry 
The Portuguese road industry has been experiencing profound changes since 
1990. The main result of these changes is a highway network in good condition, which 
allows travelling across almost all the country easily and in comfort. These highways 
are operated by private entities through concession contracts signed between them and 
                                                     
4
 Estache, António, Romero, Manuel and Bank, John Strong, The Long and Winding Path to Private 
Financing and Regulation of Toll Roads, World Bank, 2012, available [online] at: http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2000/08/14/000094946_00072805374
29/additional/102502322_20041117135503.pdf [accessed on 25 October 2012] 
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These concessions, which are of the public-private partnerships type, need to be 
subjected to regulation. The regulatory obligations designated to InIR (the institute for 
road infrastructure) together with the contracts and the legal framework, define the 
Portuguese road sector participation rules.
6
 
Between 1990 and 2000 there was a steady decrease in the number of road 
accidents resulting in death or injury in Portugal. On a yearly average, the number of 
fatalities fell by 3.2%. Since 2000, the rate of decline has accelerated, with an average 
annual decrease of 8.2% between 2000 and 2009.
7 
1.3 Brisa 
Brisa – Auto-estradas de Portugal
8
 was created in 1972. In four decades it has 
become one of the largest tolled highway operators in the world and the largest 
company in Portugal in transport infrastructure. 
Brisa's main business area is the operation of tolled highways, both through 
direct investments in Portugal, as well as through its national and international 
subsidiaries. The remaining businesses managed by the company complement its core 
business providing services associated to road safety and driving comfort in both 
highways and urban environments.
9
 All business units are independent but in somehow 
connected by their main driver: the highways.  
Brisa’s Developments  
Since Brisa’s foundation in 1972, its executives have focused their efforts on 
strengthening their competences in certain aspects. Brisa developed its skills in planning 
and project management, and in the design, construction and operation of highways. 
Considering the period from 1976 to 1998, Brisa's investment in highways accounted 
                                                     
5
 Estradas de Portugal, 2012 [online] available at : 
http://www.estradasdeportugal.pt/index.php/pt/governo-da-sociedade [accessed on 21 October 2012] 
6
  InIR – Instituto de Infra-Estruturas Rodoviárias, I.P. 2012 [online] available at: 
http://www.inir.pt/portal [accessed on 23 October 2012] 
7
 International Transport Forum, 2010 [online] available at: 
http://www.internationaltransportforum.org/irtadpublic/pdf/10IrtadReport.pdf [accessed on 12 December 
2012] 
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 Herein referred to as Brisa. 
9
 Brisa, 2012 available [online] at:  




for 0.21% of the Portuguese GDP (Exhibit 1). These investments in the development of 
Portugal are found in the construction of the two main Portuguese highways that 
connect the country from North to South, completing almost 800 kilometers of network 
(Exhibit 2). Given that its core business is not the construction of highways, Brisa 
always signs agreements with construction companies to carry out its projects.  
In 1994, Brisa won the "Tool Innovation Award" from the International Bridge 
Tunnel and Turnpike Association, for the innovation and reliability that the new teletoll 
system “Via Verde” offered, this being the direct result of the investment in innovation 
and technology that Brisa has been implementing and defending from the start for the 
industry in order to be able to build a sustainable growth. 
 
These efforts and developments led Brisa to be internationally recognized 
among companies around the world as a specialist company in the management of 
highways under concession. The company has substantial know-how accumulated over 
almost 40 years in four main fields: Planning and construction, Financing, 
Development, and Business Administration (Exhibit 3).
10
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1.4 The start of the alliance 
Brisa in 2001 
At the start of the new decade, Brisa held a comfortable position in the 
Portuguese market. In 2000, its net profit was €202.5 million (Exhibit 4). At this time, 
Brisa had a solid financial structure, with access to many financing options for its 
projects and concrete experience in this kind of financing investments. 
In 2001, the competition in Portugal in the area of infrastructure companies 
entering the market was growing and the saturation of opportunities to invest internally 
lead Brisa to start looking for new opportunities.  
Brisa was established in 1972 as a public company, and in 1995 started its 
privatization process, that finished in 2000. When the company became private, a new 
vision was taken into consideration, as António de Sousa
11
 stated:  
“As of 1995, Brisa had a stable network, beginning to realize that its network was 
mature. It now had capacity for growth and in Portugal there was no more room for 
expansion. When the privatization process ended in 2000, a time when Brisa was 
already a recognized market player, it had capital to grow, but no significant 
opportunities in Portugal. The solution was to enter the international market.” 
The leaders of Brisa were facing a new situation and had to find new ways to 
add value by developing new business models and through internationalization. This 
same year, Brisa started to develop a renovated business model, creating new business 
units such as the conversion of Via Verde into a self-managed company and acquiring 
17% of Brisal, a local competitor from the north Portugal. 
Brisa’s strategy department devised a plan to start its international expansion: 
Brisa had to find a strong, local partner, in a country where the concession of highways 
with tolls was in development. Brisa’s director João Azevedo Coutinho said: 
“Brisa looked at the international markets to start expanding its business into 
markets where the economy was growing and the country was developing its 
highways, especially tolled highways.”  
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 António Nunes de Sousa, member of the Board of Directors and of the Executive Committee, 




1.5 The CCR Group 
CCR (Companhia de Concessões Rodoviárias / Road Concession Company) was 
created by the merger of stocks held by large national groups.
12
 The company was 
initially established as a joint venture between four Brazilian construction companies 
(Andrade Gutierrez S.A.; Camargo Corrêa; Serveng Group; Odebrecht). CCR’s main 
intention was to tender in the Brazilian road concession program. 
Since the onset that diversifying its portfolio and engaging in new businesses is 
part of CCR's strategic plan for sustained growth. In its mission statements presented in 
the CCR annual report, it was clear that CCR’s strategy was based on five pillars:  
 To expand and diversify the concession network   
 To maximize the benefits of bringing together the management of its 
concessions 
 To maximize economies of scale 
 To maximize operating efficiencies of each concession 
 To explore related business activities 
In 2000, the group started to look for an international partner to help in the highway 
operations because at the time in Brazil there weren’t any companies specialized in 
these fields. Their purpose was to acquire know-how as the sole agent for the operation 
of highways.  At the time the CCR group had around 13% of market share, and already 
a large and diversified portfolio of concessions under operation.
13
 
CCR gathered information and analyzed companies from the countries with more 
experience in tolled highways, which at that time were Italy, Spain, France and 
Portugal.  
Being one of the bigger and more experienced companies in those countries, Brisa 
emerged from that situation as the natural partner.  
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[accessed on 17 October 2012] 
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Brazil in 2001 
Brazil is the largest country in South America, with an area of 8,515,767 Km2, and 
is situated on the Atlantic coast, opposite to Portugal. 
Infrastructure development was not able to keep up with the country’s 
development, roads were still in poor condition, ports and airports were not able to 
provide the capacity and service expected from the volume of trade occurring in the 
country. Nevertheless, the country made strong investments and intended to keep them 
up in order to increase development and foreign investment.  
The country would reach a paved extension of 200,000 km in 2000. Between 
1995 and 2005 three major highways (BR-101, linking Curitiba to Porto Alegre; Via 
Regis Bittencourt, linking São Paulo to Curitiba; and Via Fernão Dias, linking São 
Paulo to Belo Horizonte) were modernized. Until then, most of these highways were 
known for their high mortality rate due to traffic accidents.
14
 
The concession of highways under the toll collection system did not follow a 
clear path in Brazil. The concession model was born in 1993 was followed by a rapid 
expansion. Most major highways in Brazil would then be operated through private 
concessions, seeking a good performance of the highways, essential for the 
development of the country's economy, but by 2000, the concessions in Brazil were still 
virtually nonexistent. There were still some highways that were not private, they were 
operated by federal or state authorities.  
The concession model was based on the privatization of highways that already 




One of the reasons for the Brazilian government to catapult these private 
concessions was the fact that there were various insurgences of popular movements 
against the regulations and highway tolls. On the other hand, the regulations were not 
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 Wikipedia, 2012. Brazilian Highway System, Wikipedia [online], available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian_Highway_System [accessed on 18 December 2012] 
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 Inter-American Development Bank, 2012 available[online]  at: 
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implemented as easily as they had been in Portugal. In Brazil, the law system includes 
federal and state laws that can change independently and constantly.  
In 2000, Brazil was already a destination of foreign direct investment by 
Portuguese companies such as telecom or retail companies. The investment was 
growing in different areas. Brazil was a target for Portuguese companies, encouraged by 
cultural influences such as language, religion and the social network between countries.  
Brazil was a Portuguese colony since Pedro Álvares Cabral reached it in 1500 
and until 1815,
16
 the year in which it became independent. In the more recent years, the 
relations between both countries, as well as the mutual investment, have been developed 
by the Portuguese-Brazilian Chamber of Commerce. Almost two-thirds of the Brazilian 
people (73.57%)
17
 are roman catholic, as they originate from Portugal, where Roman 
Catholics are 84.50% of the population.
18
 
Bureaucracy and corruption led to some inefficiencies and a time consuming 
system that, together with a complex regulatory framework, delayed the day-to-day 
running of business.  
1.6 The Alliance Agreement  
By 2001, the Portuguese-Brazilian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(CCILB) was giving support and promoting the economic and trade relations between 
the two countries. Brisa and CCR were looking for opportunities, and after some 
meetings they realized that they fitted each other’s criteria. The alliance was born during 
a congress, as described by João Azevedo Coutinho: 
“Curiously enough, my first task as a Brisa employee was to attend the first 
congress of highways in Brazil. While there, I started to develop my contact network 
with the major companies in Brazil. It was then that the first contact with the CCR 
group was established.” 
After analyzing the international opportunities, Brisa started negotiations with 
the CCR Group.  Between 2001 and 2003, it acquired 20% of CCR’s business, a €183.2 
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 Wikipedia, 2012. Brazil, wikipedia [online], available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazil [accessed 
on 18 December 2012] 
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 Demographic Census Report, 2000  IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics) available 
[online] at: http://www.ibge.gov.br/english/ [accessed on 18 December 2012] 
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million investment divided into four different cash outflows (Exhibit 5). It then created 
a Brazilian local company called BPE (Brisa Participações e Empreendimentos) 
responsible for this participation.  
In the alliance contract, it was established that Brisa would always have to equal 
or exceed the participation of the other alliance partners. As João Azevedo Coutinho put 
it:  
“In addition, our agreement requiring that we would always have a share that 
equalled or exceeded that of the other partners, also included a clause providing that 
any new project would have to be submitted for the approval of one of our members 
of the board.” 
By 2001, one year after the foundation, the CCR Group was established, each 
partner holding a 20% share. In the same year that the company became public, the 
company released 34.8% of its shares to the public, forming a new structure.
19
 
 Inside the local company BPE, Brisa was represented by one director and one 
financial controller (Exhibit 6). They normally changed every three or four years 
according to Brisa’s international human resources department.  BPE was represented in 
the Executive Committee of CCR by the director who would be in Brazil at the time.  
João Azevedo Coutinho was the member of the Board of Directors of CCR for Brisa 
during the whole alliance time (Exhibit 7).  
1.7 2001 to 2009 
From the onset, Brisa faced new challenges in Brazil while participating in the 
operation and maintenance of the highways. As described by the first local executive 
representing Brisa, Manuel Lamego
20
:  
“When we arrived in Brazil, the market and the highways seemed the same or 
very similar but afterwards things were different. The structure of the highways was 
somehow equal to Portugal but when we talk about the technical characteristics of a 
highway in Europe, they are totally different in Brazil. For example at the time there 
were bus stops in the middle of the highways. Also in terms of access to the highways 
things were circumstantially different. Things in general weren’t the same, they 
weren’t worst, they were just different.” 
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 Brisa, 2012; “Annual Report 2001”.  Available  [online] at 
http://brisa.pt/PresentationLayer/textos00.aspx?menuid=152 [accessed on 27 September 2012] 
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On the other hand, the traffic rules were different, as mentioned by António 
Nunes:   
“The traffic in Brazil was completely undisciplined. Typically there were 
pedestrians and bicycles on a highway. There was a great lack of discipline, and a 
large number of deaths due to traffic accidents.” 
Brisa also encountered diverse situations when facing the first international 
expansion, such as legal, social and economic differences.  Brisa faced situations that 
contributed to their future international expansion, as stated by Manuel Lamego:  
“We faced problems like our work permits and other legal issues that we had not 
thought of, and a language that seemed to be the same but that ultimately led to 
language misunderstandings. The laws and tax requirements were very different. In 
the first year we had to tackle issues that would have been easier to deal with if we 
had thought of them beforehand”. 
 Brisa also faced new market differences in Brazil, as for instance the size of the 
highways, which in general were significantly bigger. For example, Brisa was 
responsible for the management and control of the Rodonorte Highway, a 481 km road, 
almost twice the size of the longest highway in Portugal, as Valdemar Mendes stated:  
 “The longest distance between main cities in Portugal is around 200 km, while 
in Brazil it is around 500 km, and there are certain parts of the highway where for 
many kilometres there are no villages or major cities. 
In 2004, the group acquired Via Oeste and made a follow-on offering, redefining 
their corporate strategy and assuring for CCR a minimum of 51% of the total number of 
shares. After one of the partners left (Oderbrecht), one year before, the group 
reorganized its structure (Exhibit 8). By this time the relationship between the partners 
seemed to be in synchronization with the transfer of competencies. As the board 
representative Antonio Sousa put it:  
“We had a technical cooperation program with CCR that allowed the transfer of 
people from Brazil to Portugal and vice-versa, in order to get in contact with certain 
practices and methods during three month periods.” 
With the growing of CCR, the headquarters of the group were changed in order 
to keep up with the company size. BPE was also always changing their location into 
inside the headquarters of the CCR group or in the nearest building.   
In 2006 the company diversified its portfolio, securing the concession of the 
“Linha 4 Metro de São Paulo” an important underground line in the heart of Sao Paulo. 
11 
 




In 2007, Brisa started its internationalization in North America together with 
CCR, running the Northwest Parkway concession, in Colorado. This project was led by 
Brisa (90%) with a small participation of CCR (10%).  One year later the project had 
already a positive EBITDA margin of 26%.
22
  
In 2008, CCR got the concession of Rodoanel and Renovias, assuring that the 
company fulfilled its growing strategy and portfolio diversification. One year later, 
Brisa’s operational targets were met, with an EBITDA of 72% reinforcing its financial 
strength. The net profit increased by 6% compared to 2008 and throughout the nine 
years of the alliance (Exhibit 4).  
The last representative of Brisa in Brazil, Valdemar Mendes made a curious 
statement about the relationship between CCR and Brisa throughout the years:  
“The relations between the shareholders were almost of friendship and cordiality 
and when things work like that, everything becomes much easier.” 
Valdemar Mendes also mentioned the importance of the first international 
expansion and its contribution to the future expansion of Brisa:  
“When Brisa decided to go to other international markets, we knew that we 
needed to be much more careful and needed more and better market research and to 
study the local trends.” 
The stock price of the CCR Group since the beginning of the alliance increased 
more than 700% (Exhibit10). Despite the difficult macro-economic conditions 
prevailing in Portugal, Brisa registered a positive year in 2009, consolidating its strong 
market performance. The share price climbed 34.2%, corresponding to a value per share 
of €7.18, countering the decline of the previous year (Exhibit 11).
23
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In time, Brisa’s shareholding position in CCR was close to €1,100 million.
24
 In 
2009, CCR was the largest private group operating in the road infrastructure sector in 
Brazil, managing 1,571 km of highways in this country.
25
 
In 2009, the manager of BPE, Valdemar Mendes, referred to the previous years 
thus:  
“After the first few years of the alliance the CCR partners started to understand 
the methods and techniques of the operation and management of highways. We 
adjusted our mission and goals to other variants without abandoning the operation 
and maintenance of highways.” 
Portugal was posting a weak economic growth since the beginning of the 
millennium, below the Euro area average. Due to the European crisis, economic growth 
contracted 2.9% in 2009. Brazil also registered a contraction in the economy but 
showed a clearly higher CAGR in the period from 2001 to 2009 (Exhibit 12). 
Brisa’s other internationalization processes  
Only one year after the first internationalization and independently from the 
CCR group, Brisa started its expansion program, acquiring 4% of Abertis, a major 
player in Spain. The chairman of Brisa, Vasco de Mello, understood that the business 
model of internationalization should take one form: 
“The CCR in Brazil was the first Brisa operation in the international market and 
demonstrates the feasibility of Brisa’s model for growth based on partnerships.” 
In 2005, Brisa expanded their business, implementing a toll system in the Czech 
Republic and in the same year made a partnership to tender for the construction of the 
two main roads in Poland.
26
 Two years later Brisa started a project in Holland with 
Movenience, a company in which Brisa held 30% (Exhibit 9). 
1.8 The final year of the alliance, 2010 
In the beginning of 2010 the Portuguese company suffered a downgrade of 
Standard and Poor's credit rating from "BBB" to "BBB-". At the time, the agency noted 
                                                     
24
 Brisa, 2012; “Annual Report 2009” available [online] at 
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that Brisa’s liquidity risk was "less than adequate". The weaker economic outlook for 
Portugal should also be reflected in the performance of traffic flows in the country. 
In 2010, Brisa faced the decrease of the Portuguese economy which translated 
into a decrease in the number of people using the tolled highways. This situation ended 
by affecting their share price, according to the statement made by the Chairman Vasco 
de Mello in the Annual Report: 
“At the financial level and in terms of stock market performance, we saw an 
excessive correlation between the rise in Portugal's sovereign risk and Brisa's stock 
performance” 
After some internal decisions, Brisa decided to sell their participation in the 
CCR group. Starting on 24 September, Brisa sold their position to its partners and in the 
stock market in three phases.  
Vasco de Mello mentioned that the profit from the operation was used not only 
to strengthen the financial position of the company, but also to finance its future growth 
in other regions. 
"The sale does not mean a negative view of Brazil or CCR," Vasco de Mello said 
in a conference call with local analysts. "Brisa need to prepare for the future and this 
was the best solution.”
27
 
The sale was carried out gradually in consecutive installments throughout the 
year. The challenge consisted of arranging an exit strategy while preventing that 
expectations of future sales contaminated the stock, causing its devaluation. Brisa 
received a gross value of €1,318.2 million from the sale, translated into a net value of 
€1,156 million. The disposal process was based on a mixed model which included part 
of the sale in M&A (with major shareholders acquiring 6% of the capital) and the 
remaining 10.35% sold on the capital market. Brisa carefully chose the most appropriate 
moment to make its block trade, in order to optimize total proceeds (Exhibit 13). 
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1.9 Legacy left in Brazil 
After Brisa’s exit of the CCR group the relationship between both parties 
remained professional and friendly. Brisa is still active due to its participation in BPE in 
Controlar, an automobile inspection company where the know-how gained at 
Controlauto, a company which Brisa holds in Portugal also helped.
28
 
In 2012, Brisa and CCR signed a preliminary agreement to evaluate and eventual 
tender for the privatization of the Portuguese airport management company.
29
 
The relations also remained very friendly as the last representative Valdemar 
Mendes said:  
 “Nowadays Brisa’s and CCR’s managers are still friends, together we think 
about new business opportunities or we just simply get together for social meetings.” 
1.10 Conclusion 
After nine years of alliance, the CFO of Brisa and the main responsible for its 
first internationalization process declared:  
“We got to a certain point where we considered that the curve of value creation 
was starting to invert its trend. It doesn’t mean that if we had kept the alliance we 
couldn’t have gained more value but its rhythm would be much slower and the risk 
higher.” 
 In 2012 CCR was considered one of the biggest concession companies in the 
world and registered an undoubting growth over the nine years of the alliance. Did 
Brisa’s transfer of technology to CCR both in terms of management and operation 
propel the concession’s development and projection in the Brazilian market and at 
international level?  
What factors led the alliance to success?  Did Brisa take the right approach in a 
cross border alliance? In the different approaches of business management, which 
company benefitted more with this alliance and what was the know-how transferred?  
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 Exame Brasil, 2012, Companies available [online] at: 
http://exame.abril.com.br/negocios/empresas/noticias/brisa-e-ccr-desistem-de-acordo-para-privatizacao-
da-ana [accessed on 5 December 2012] 
15 
 
Exhibit 1: State Investments and their weight on the GDP 
















National Roads 0.29 0.35 0.41 0.56 0.76 0.48 
Municipal Roads 0.32 0.41 0.36 0.45 0.45 0.40 
Highways 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.31 0.34 0.21 
Ports 0.14 0.19 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.12 
Airports 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.05 
Railways 0.30 0.15 0.20 0.29 0.49 0.29 
Source: Alfredo M. Pereira, Jorge M. Andraz, Public Investment in Transportation Infrastructure and 
Economic Performance in Portugal, Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, 
Department of Economics, vol. 32(1), pages 1-20, June 2007 
 
Exhibit 2: Portuguese Brisa Network Km in Operation 1986-2001  
 













1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
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Exhibit 4: Brisa Key Figures 2000-2009 
million € 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Ebitda 315 357 384 403 424 418 418 460 483 482 
Ebit 229 263 271 275 315 296 294 281 277 223 
Net Profit 203 212 213 152 191 298 167 259 152 161 
 
Source: Brisa 2001 Annual Report 
 
Exhibit 5: Brisa Cash-Flows in CCR 
million € 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total 
Cash 
Outflows 
126.3 30.7 26.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 183.2 
Cash 
Inflows 
0 0 0 0 23.5 27.7 40.5 41.9 34.6 44 212.2 
 





Exhibit 6: BPE structure and timeline 
 
 
Source: Brisa 2011 Annual Report 
 
Exhibit 7: Brisa representatives in the CCR group 
 
Source: Information released during the interviews with the members of Brisa’s Board of Directors. 
  
1 Executive Member 
(General Manager of 
BPE) 
1 Director                 




Exhibit 8: CCR Group Shareholders in 2006 
 




Exhibit 9: Brisa 2008 New Projects 
 
Projects 
Northwest Parkway Movenience 
Brisa 90% 30% 
Other Partners 10%  
CCR 10%  
Westershelde Tunnel  60% 
NedMobiel  10% 
 
 




Exhibit 10: CCR Share price history 2002 - 2012 
 































Exhibit 12: GDP Evolution in Portugal and Brazil (2000- 20011) 
 
 
Source: World Bank, 2012. GDP growth (annual %) 
 
 
Exhibit 13: Cash-Inflow Timing and Values of Brisa participation in the CCR Group 
 
Buyer % Data 
Share Price 
(BRL) 
Net Value (million €) 
CCR Shareholders 6 % September 24
th
 37.4 382 
Stock Market     
1
st
 Phase 3.61% October & November 45.9 281 
2
nd
 Phase 6.75& December 15th 43 439 
     
Total 16.36%   1.156 
Source: Brisa Annual Report 
  
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Portugal 3.92% 1.97% 0.76% -0.91% 1.56% 0.78% 1.45% 2.37% -0.01% -2.91% 1.41% -1.61% 








 In the Case Study some information may be slightly distorted, either for 
simplification purposes or to maintain Brisa’s and CCR’s confidentiality, but ultimately 
all basic facts have been maintained. 
2.2 Synopsis 
 
 In 2000, Brisa, a Portuguese tolled highway operation company, started their 
internationalization program, following the new managerial vision provided from the 
privatization phases occurred at the end of the 90’s. In Portugal, Brisa was the major 
highway operations company, responsible for the management and operation of the 
main roads across the country.  
 The internationalization process of Brisa started in Brazil, with a joint venture 
with local partners which became the CCR Group.  The case describes the origin of this 
alliance, how it was developed and the transfer of expertise between both parties as well 
as the results of the alliance. The description of the alliance is composed by a series of 
events and facts that enhance the know-how acquisition by each party for the whole 
duration.  
 Two years after the end of this alliance the managers and executives of Brisa 
want to understand and clarify what were the key points that transformed this alliance in 
a good financial return as well as to understand what were the lessons learned and the 





2.3 Suggested Assignment Questions 
 Students should read the case and come to class prepared to discuss the 
following questions: 
Part I – Before the Alliance 
1. What market and company characteristics led Brisa to think in new business 
opportunities? What where those opportunities? 
2. Before Brisa joined the CCR group what characterized the company? What were 
the differences encountered by Brisa between the Brazilian and the Portuguese 
markets? 
Part II – The Alliance Results 
3. What type of agreement did Brisa have with CCR? Can you consider any 
relationship between the type of agreement and the primary purposes of the 
agreement?  
4. In the negotiation of the alliance strategy and regarding the scope of the alliance, 
what were Brisa’s actions to try to ensure success?  
5. In the different fields of the scope of the alliance which company do you believe 
benefited more from the alliance?  
  
2.4 Teaching Objectives 
 
The teaching objectives of this case are as follow: 
 To understand the evolution of the major companies in the country from its 
conception to its internationalization.  
 To have students acquire a good understanding of the market and industry 
culture in different countries. 
 To help students explore different structural and corporate cross-border 
problems. 
 To highlight the complexity of an internationalization process and how to 




 To illustrate to students the different strategic objectives of the companies across 
the alliance agreement. 
 To have students familiarize themselves with the purposes of strategic alliances 
and their scope.  
 To help students evaluate the creation of value and the benefits of international 
alliances in the different fields of business. 
 
2.5 Use of the Case 
 
The case allows the students to study a set of real business decisions that should 
help them find a partner in the business world. They should also be able to analyze it 
from the view point of making strategic decisions about cross-border alliances and 
through corporate organizations as well as in terms of the purpose of value creation for 
the companies. Even though the case story seems simple, there are some important 
issues relating to the market selection and the reasons for the internationalization.  
The Brisa and CCR case can be used in an undergraduate or master strategy course 
under the topic of internationalization strategies. It can also be used in the courses of 
strategic alliances or of corporate strategy. 
2.6 Relevant Theory 
 
This case aims at introducing international business administration students to the 
strategy alliances of companies abroad. In order to enrich this learning experience, some 
theoretical models and information to support this case discussion and analysis were 
included in the teaching note. The following books and respective theories were used in 
this analysis: 
- PEST Analysis: Freire, A., Estratégia – Sucesso em Portugal, Verbo,12th 
edition, 2008. 
- M. Michael Y. Yoshino, U. Srinivasa Rangan, An Entrepreneurial Approach to 
Globalization, Harvard Business School Press. 1995. 
- Yves L. Doz, Gary Hamel, Alliance Advantage: the art of creating value 




- SWOT framework:  Porter, M., Competitive Advantage: Creating and 
Sustaining Superior Performance, 1985. 
- The Cultural, Administrative, Geographical and Economical distancies model 
(The CAGE Model): Ghemawat, Pankaj. Siegel, Jordan, Redefining Global 
Strategy: Crossing borders in a world where differences still matter, Harvard 
Business Review Press, Chapter 2, 2007. 
2.7  Analysis and Discussion 
The analysis and discussion of this case study is planned according to the 
assignment questions. The case is calculated to be lectured in a 90 minutes class. 
(In the beginning of the class, teachers should ask a student to summarize, in 2-3 
minutes, the most important information in the case. After letting different students 
intervene with other comments they may have on the most important information, 
teachers should go on to the first assignment question). 
Part I – Before the Alliance                (25 minutes) 
1. What market and company characteristics led Brisa to think in new business 
opportunities? What where those opportunities? 
To analyze the Portuguese market we must understand that Portugal had a 
highway network in good condition (page 2) and a positive GDP growth, and take into 
account that the highway system reached most parts of Portugal, and the laws and 
regulations were stabilized (page 2). Through Brisa, Portugal developed Via Verde, a 
reference across the world. This information can be summarized on a PEST analysis, 





TN Exhibit 1: Portuguese Road Concession Industry PEST Analysis 
Political Context 
 Managed by private entities 
 Regulation defined by InIR 
 Laws and governments stabilized 
Economic Context  Positive GDP Growth rate 
Social-Cultural Context 
 Easiness to travel 
 Access to almost all country by 
highway 
Technological Context 
 Highway network in good health 
 Development of Via Verde 
Source: Case Writer 
In 2000, the Portuguese market was facing a new situation where, after a decade 
of growing, the industry was mature (page 4). The construction and maintenance of the 
highways was an important step in the Portuguese economy as the only considerable 
player in the market (page 3) as can be seen in Exhibit 1. TN Exhibit 2 shows where 
the Portuguese industry is located, with an industry lifecycle chart taken from Porter, 
Michael E. (1980), Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior 
Performance, pp.157-8, 1985 
TN Exhibit 2: Portuguese Road Concession Industry Lifecycle 
 





 When the question is about characterizing the company, about the company 
strengths and weaknesses that can be translated into opportunities, Brisa can be 
analysed with a SWOT framework developed by Porter, Michael E. (1980), Competitive 
Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance, pp.157-8, 1985  
represented on the TN Exhibit 3. As a specialist operator of highways, Brisa finds in 
internationalization a big opportunity as well as a possibility for the diversification into 
new business models (page 4) in the medium-long term, based on the strengths shown 
in its value chain (Exhibit 3). Besides the operation and management of highways, these 
strengths can also be found in the financial market, with a solid presence in the debt and 
equity capital markets.  
On the other hand, as shown in TN Exhibit 2, the Portuguese market represents a 
threat with no space for growth. The competitors in Europe, in countries with tolled 
highways, are also a threat to Brisa’s aspirations for the international market.  
TN Exhibit 3 SWOT Analysis of Brisa in 2000 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 Operation and Management Experts 
 Solid Presence on the debt and equity 
capital market 
 Portugal tolled highways growth rate 




 Innovation and diversification 
 European competitors in countries 
with tolled highways 
Source: Case Writer 
 
2. Before Brisa joined the CCR group what characterized the company? What were 
the differences encountered by Brisa between the Brazilian and the Portuguese 
markets? 
The CCR group was created by large construction companies to achieve market 
leadership in the concession network (page 5). TN Exhibit 4 summarizes the SWOT 




that it was made up of large national groups, providing capacity to gain more 
concessions and financial strength. On the other hand, the fact that it was only a 
construction company and not a specialized company in the concession industry makes 
it a weakness for the group.  
The growing of concessions in Brazil at the start of the millennium canbe 
considered a good opportunity (page 6). On the other hand, the rise of these concessions 
gave way to the creation of new competitors. The instability of the governments and 
regulations can also be seen as a threat to the group.  
TN Exhibit 4: SWOT Analysis of the CCR group before Brisa 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 Market dominated by large national 
groups 
 Lack of specialization in the 
concessions operations and 
maintenance 
Opportunities Threats 
 Growing of the concessions market 
launched by the government  
 The growing competitors 
 Instability of governments and 
regulations 
Source: Case Writer 
To answer the second part of the question it is important to measure the 
differences/similarities between Portugal and Brazil, emphasizing the distances in 
different fields. To be able to do that, the CAGE framework gives a good perspective. 
The most important information is summarized in TN Exhibit 5. Some parts of this 
analysis indicate a strong relationship between both countries but in real situations faced 
by Brisa managers and described below, the difference between countries is bigger than 
expected.  
Concerning the cultural distance between Portugal and Brazil the language is the 
same (page 6), which led us to reduce distances but sometimes led to misunderstandings 
(page 7), relevant to the industry contracts and management. The ethnicities in Portugal 




The social norms between countries, as described by Manuel Lamego (page 7), 
and Antonio Sousa (page 8), were big, since the rules and habits of the Brazilian people 
regarding conducts and behaviours in the highways led to difficulties in the adaptation 
process and standards taken from Portugal.   
Concerning the ethnic aspects, both countries are linked by one major religion, 
the Roman Catholic, which helps to shrink the distance between people, contributing to 
a better social relationship between workers.  
The overall cultural distances can be classified as medium. 
 As for the administrative distance between Portugal and Brazil, one can consider 
the colonial ties, the currency issues and the political association.  Firstly, the fact that 
Brazil was a Portuguese colony created a link (page 6) and it diminished the distance 
between countries. The currency in Brazil is the Real, which revealed some difficulties 
in terms of transfer of dividends regarding the legal issues (page 7). The political 
instability and the fact that Brazil is a federal state with different laws and rules between 
them increased the distance between the countries because it was difficult to implement 
the operation rules of the tolled highways as they were implemented in Portugal (page 
8). The overall administrative distance can be considered medium/ high.  
Regarding the geographic distance, Portugal and Brazil are separated by an 
ocean, but the industry itself does not have transportation costs of resources. The 
resources needed for the business, normally are acquired in the country, so in terms of 
physical distance, there are no limitations. The only inconvenience is the distance 
between the Brisa administrators and their home country as well as the communications 
between them. The lack of local supervision can create difficulties to the alliance’s 
health, this being the reason why Brisa insured the presence of local managers in Brazil 
to reduce the distances between countries.  
The size of Brazil affected the operation of Brisa experts regarding the length of 
the highways and the distance between the two countries led the operational team facing 
new issues that did not occur in Portugal, such as the lack of villages or cities between 
major cities (page 7). The overall ranking of the geographic distance is then classified 




Finally the economic aspect between countries in 2000 can be found in Exhibit 
12. Comparing the GDP and the GDP per capita it is possible to see that in those years 
the distance was increasing, which can be translated by the number of cars using tolled 
highways. So the distance can be considered high.  
Part II – The analysis of the alliance                (90 minutes) 
3. What type of agreement did Brisa sign with CCR? Can you consider any 
relationship between the type of agreement and the primary purposes of the 
agreement?  
The agreement that Brisa signed with CCR was a strategic alliance, by which 
Brisa acquired 20% of CCR’s business a €183.2 million investment (page 6). This 
interfirm link can be described as an Unequal Equity Joint Venture as it provided an 
equity arrangement between parties and the creation of a new entity (Yoshino, Michael 
Y., Strategic alliances: an entrepreneurial approach to globalization, Harvard Business 





TN Exhibit 6: Types of Interfirm Links 
 Source: Case Writer  
Regarding the typology of the alliance, according to Michael Yoshino and 
Srinivasa Rangan framework
30
 present on TN Exhibit 7, this alliance can be called a 
Competitive Alliance, considering the high extent of organization interaction found in 
the cooperation programs  (page 8) and the presence of Brisa in any decision made by 
the group (page 7).  The potential for conflict between parties regarding the tactical and 
strategic field is also high since the CCR group wants to gain and expand the concession 
network  (page 10) and so does Brisa (page 4).   
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Low High  
  Extent of Organizational Interaction 
 
Source:  Michael Y.Yoshino, U.Srinivasa Rangan, Strategic Alliances: an entrepreneurial approach to 
globalization, Harvard Business School Press, 1995 / Case Writer 
Regarding the primary purpose of the alliance and its value creation and capture, 
according to Yves L. Doz, Gary Hamel, Alliance Advantage: the art of creating value 
through partnering, Harvard Business School Press, 1998 there are three types of 
primary purposes: the Co-option; the Co-specialization; and the Learning and 
Internalization. According to the case study this alliance has as its primary purpose the 
Co-specialization between companies. The issues that led to this option are: what does 
my potential partner bring that is unique? And what is the source of that uniqueness? 
Brisa is specialized in the management and operation of concessions and the 
other partners are experts and well known in the Brazilian market.  So this alliance has 
as its primary purpose the synergistic value creation that results from the combination of 
previously separate resources, positions, skills and knowledge in the different areas of 
expertise of each partner, such as construction, knowledge about the Brazilian market, 





4. In the negotiation of the alliance strategy and regarding the scope of the alliance, 
what were Brisa’s actions to try to ensure success?  
Regarding the scope of the alliance, there are three main aspects to be 
considered in this strategic alliance
31
. They are the Strategic, the Operational and the 
Economic fields.  
In the strategic field, Brisa opted to ensure that it had at least the same or a 
higher percentage than the other partners (page 7) to guarantee their presence across 
borders and power in the decision making process regarding new projects and activities. 
The presence in the executive committees and in the board of directors allowed Brisa to 
defend its rights in this partnership. 
Concerning the operational issues, the technical cooperation exchange program 
provided a larger "exchange surface" on which members of the partner firms can 
interact, communicate and learn from each other (page 8). The physical positioning of 
the BPE (local Brisa representative) also always helped Brisa to stay in contact with the 
day-to-day activities involved in the alliance. 
Finally, in what concerns the economic aspect, Brisa ensured that the value or 
cost of the interdependencies between partners was recognised by all partners 
throughout the contract ensuring as well the presence in the stock market so that all the 
accounts were more transparent.  
5. In the different fields of the scope of the alliance which company do you believe 
benefited more from the alliance?  
To answer this question, the students should elaborate a pros and cons table of 
the different issues regarding the strategic, operational and economic drivers for both 
parts: Brisa and the CCR group. 
The first issue analysed is the strategic field issue, as can be seen in the Brisa 
case, had the internationalization in its objectives. On the other hand, the shareholders 
of CCR wanted to understand the management and operation of highways to be able to 
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diversify their portfolio, so these were the strategic objectives for both parts. Analysing 
the strategies and the results of both companies we can draw various conclusions.  
On the pros side, as mentioned in the case, after the first years Brisa started to 
increase the number of internationalizations to more diverse cultures (page 9), 
expanding to  Spain, the Czech Republic, Poland and Holland. Brisa also enlarged its 
operation and management techniques by dealing in markets with different sizes (page 
8) and characteristics. Brisa also gained the experience of being present in one of the 
bigger companies in the world of the road infrastructure sector (page 10).  
In addition, the model adopted in partnerships gave Brisa the knowledge of how 
to enter foreign markets, as can be seen from the partnerships that followed (Exhibit 
13), always using a local partner and also a construction company as partner.   
On the part of the CCR Group, it essentially acquired the knowledge and the best 
practices brought by Brisa regarding the operation and management of highways, which 
led them to reach one of the strategic pillars: the maximization of the operation 
efficiency in the concessions. 
In the operational aspect, during the time of the alliance, there were clearly two 
distinct positions. Regarding the pros and cons for Brisa:  
 
Pros:  
- The gain of knowledge through exchange programs (page 8) 
- Experience in dealing with different market situations (i.e.: size of the 
highways (page 8) 
- Experience in the approach of other foreign markets (page 9) 
- Relation with other shareholders in a different country  
- Overall management skills  
Cons:  
- The CCR gain the knowledge of managing concessions, the key strength 





Analysing the pros and cons for the CCR group: 
Pros: 
- Acquisition of experience and know-how in the operation and 
management of tolled highways.  
- Techniques and technologies used in the toll systems 
Cons: 
- Loss of the opportunity of the monopoly control in the operational area 
due to the impossibility of having more shares than Brisa  
- Dependent on the approval of the Brisa partners to start new project 
Finally, regarding the financial aspect, it is possible to evaluate the presence of 
Brisa in Brazil from different perspectives:  
1. Analysing the Cash Flows subtracting the Inflows from the Outflows 
presented on Exhibit 5, excluding the value of the alienation:  
Total Inflows – Total Outflows = €212.2 -€183.2 = €29 million 
2. Considering the gain from the alienation of Brisa’s stake in CCR  is the 
Return on Investment tool: 
a = Net value of the alienation + Inflows  
b = Outflows  
ROI = (Gains from Investmentª – Cost of Investment
b
) / (Cost of Investment) = 
[(1156+212.2) – 183.2)] / 183.2 = 647 %    
 Based on these figures, the alienation of Brisa seemed very attractive and a 
better output in finance issues than the CCR partners, but the value spent by the other 
partners can be attenuated in the dividends that the company is generating by the 





In conclusion, it is possible to say that both companies gain in different fields, in 
different ways. On a whole, it is possible to sum up parts and conclude that on the 
overall alliance analysis, both companies gained but it is difficult to measure the value 
that Brisa took in by opening doors to other countries and also difficult to measure the 
value of know-how in the operation and maintenance released by the Brisa to other 
partners. 
 
